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With the appearance of volume 3 in 1998, Wolfhart Pannenberg's
Systematic Theology is now available to English readers in its entirety-all
sixteen hundred pages of it. The multivolume project is a fitting capstone
to a brilliant theological career. Theologians variously draw praise for
originality, for careful arguments, for sweepingtheologicalvision, and for
extensive scholarship. However, Pannenberg's work is impressive on all
counts. Since he first attracted international attention nearly forty years
ago with his revisionary-many thought revolutionary-interpretation of
Christian eschatology, Pannenberg has steaddy worked his way across a
wide front of theological issues, moving his thought forward, as well as
outward, in the process. The culminating work of his career is much more
than a summary of what he has done before.
Indeed, Pannenberg's offering is arguably the most impressive systematic
theology to emerge during the last quarter century. Other influential
theologians, such as Jiirgen Moltmann and Eberhard Jungel, have produced
noteworthy studies on various doctrinal themes, but no one in Pannenberg's
league has produced a full-fledged system, an integrated presentation that
encompasses the entire scope of Christian faith. Moreover, Pannenberg's
endeavor succeeds by every relevant standard of theological importance. It is
biblically based, historically informed, ecclesiasticallysensitive, philosophically
sophisticated,and contemporary and constructive. Like the best of what Paul
Tillich calls "apologetic theology," Pannenberg's work takes seriously the task
of addressing the modern world. In fact,that is one of the distinguishing themes

of his work: theology must demonstrate the credibility of its claims.
In spite of the title, Pannenberg does much more than assemble the
various themes and issues that Christian theology must face. He brings to
them his own unifying vision. Thus, what we have in this work is not merely
systematic,but constructive, theology at its best. It reflects on the whole range
of Christian beliefs from the perspective of a powerful, original mind.
There is no way a single article can do justice to Pannenberg's sweeping
project, of course. Immense in scope and meticulously constructed, t h s work
will no doubt generate doctoral dissertationsand techcal discussionsfor years
to come, and eventually all its positions will receive careful analysis. Our
objective here is to convey a general feel for Pannenberg's overall project, a
general sense of the basic dynamic that moves through the various parts of lus
system. We will fim sketch some of the ideas that pervade Pannenberg's work,
then describe one or two of the salient points in his treatment of each major
doctrine, and fmally step back and critique his overall proposal, noting one or
two of its problematic aspects.

Pervasive Themes in Pannenbwg
Three pervasive themes in Pannenberg's thought are eschatology,
Trinity, and truth. What would happen if we started our theology at the
end instead of the beginning? If we turned the traditional sequence of
doctrines upside down and made eschatology basic to everything else? As
a recent book on Pannenberg indicates, Beginning with the End, that is
exactly what he does in his Systematic Theology. He interprets the entire
range of Christian belief as an outworking of the basic conviction that
history will end in the full and final establishment of God's reign. "The
eschatological future of God in the coming of his kingdom is the
standpoint from which to understand the world as a whole" (2:146). So,
even though he takes up the major doctrines in more or less their
traditional order, starting with God and concluding with last things, the
concept of a coming consummation permeates the entire scheme. It affects
his understanding of revelation, God, humanity, salvation, and church.
Perhaps most important, it affects his understanding of truth.
For Pannenberg, there is a close connection between eschatology and
truth, because events, like words, acquire meaning only in context. When
someone utters a word, we don't know precisely what the word means
until we hear the entire sentence. We need the whole context in order to
understand each part. Similarly, we need to see the entire course of
history in order to understand the meaning of each event.' This is why
'This illustration is particularly apt of the German language, which in certain
constructions places the verb or an important part of the verb at the end of the sentence.

eschatology is basic to Christian theology. The final future makes history
a totality, so it determines the meaning of all that comes before.
Pannenberg's theological system is also marked by a concern for
truth, in particular the truth about God. And this distinguishes him from
many other theologians today. For neo-orthodoxy and the more recent
"postliberal," "confessional," or "nonfoundationalist" approaches to
Christian thought, truth is the presupposition of theology. The contents
of Christian theology are more or less self-authenticating, and the
theologian's task is to explicate or bear witness to them. But for
Pannenberg, Christian claims must be established, not merely assumed.
Evidence and argument play an important role in theology.
Pannenberg joins a long tradition of theologians in seeking to
establish the truth of Christianity, but there is nothing traditional in the
way he goes about it. For one thing, assessing the truth of Christian
claims is not a separate discipline for him. Unlike older natural theologies
or more recent theological "prolegomena," Pannenbergdiscussesthe truth
of revelation throughout his theological program. Moreover, he not only
develops arguments by appealing to our common human experience, as
does traditional natural theology; he also turns to the contents of faith and
develops rather striking arguments from them. In the case of God, for
example, he appeals to religious history, not the classical arguments for
God's existence. In the case of Christology, he argues for the historicity
of Jesus' resurrection. And in the case of eschatology, he argues for the
rationality of a general resurrection of the dead.
Another important theme in Pannenberg's system is the Trinity.
Along with a number of contemporary theologians, Pannenberg finds a
rich resource for Christian thought in the church's ancient reflections on
God as Father, Son, and Spirit. He, too, sees salvation history as a
disclosure of God's eternal reality and views God's inner life as the
ultimate context for all the major concerns of Christian faith-creation,
salvation, and the final consummation. Love leads God to create a finite
reality, which he loves and cares for, to redeem this world and restore it
to the divine life. So, there is an intimate relation between God's saving
actions and the divine essence. God's great love propels him into the
world, so to speak, and he seeks to bring the world into his embrace.
These are not the only themes that concern Pannenberg. Nor does he
strive to weave them into a tight logical fabric. He doesn't deduce all his
conclusions from basic premises, or tie all his doctrinal points into a tidy
bundle. Different topics require different methods of inquiry, he argues.
Nevertheless, he does relate his central concerns to each other. Both truth
and Trinity have an eschatological character.

Truth and eschatology are closely related, because only with the fina
consummation will the full meaning of history appea2 and the truth about
God, humanity and creation be fully manifest. Short of the consummation,
our grasp of these realities is provisional, not just becaw our understanding
is limited, but also because their identity is not fixed until history has run its
full course. "Creation will be complete," Pannenberg asserts, "only with the
eschatological consummation of the world" (2:wi).
God's divinity is an eschatological reality, too, for God's lordship, or
reign, is fully established only with the final consummation. To put it
starkly, only then is God fully God! Because the drama of God's inner life
unfolds in creaturely history, God's life becomes complete only when
history reaches its conclusion. Love takes God into the world and finds
fulfdlment when all creation enters its embrace. With these "Pannenbergian"
themes in mind, let us follow his path through the major Christian
doctrines, noting some highlights along the way.

Volume I: Theology and God
Pannenberg's discussion of the truth of Christian faith serves as a
counterpart to the natural theologies or theistic arguments that abound in
traditionaltheological tomes. While he agrees with neo-orthodoxthinkers that
all knowledge of God depends on revelation: he also insists, with liberal or
Enlightenment thinkers, that the truth of revelation must be argued for, not
merely asserted. The experience of revelation is not self-authenticating. It
requires confirmation from the sphere of our larger experience. To achieve
this, Pannenberg attempts to show that revelation and God are inextricably
linked and that we can argue for God's reality on the basis of this connection.
Pannenbergreverses the conventional understandingof religion and God.
For many in the modern age, religion is a purely anthropological
phenomenon, a function of human nature, and God is merely a particular
manifestation of religion. But for Pannenberg, religion doesn't produce God;
God produces religion. If we look at the actual content of religion-not to an
abstraction like "human religiousness"-we see that concrete religions have an
intentional quality; they point to the divine which evokes them. Therefore,
we cannot give religion a purely anthropological basis.
A close inspection of "religion" leads to the same conclusion. The idea
that religion is a function of human experience presupposes that human
nature is a unity. And the idea of human unity derives from a sense of divine
'This does not mean that the end is a complete mystery until it occurs. Because God's
saving activity contains "proleptic"manifestations of the end of history, we can develop an
understandingof the end as it "arrives"ahead of time in the great events of salvation history.
'"God can be known,"he asserts, "onlyif he gives himself to be known" (1:189).

unity. But this is the culmination of God's self-revelation in human history,
particularly the history of Israel. Thus, the history of religion is a
manifestation of the unity of deity, not the other way around (1:149-150).
The crucial question, of course, is whether concrete religions establish the
truth of God. And the answer, says Pannenberg, lies in their capacity to
interpret human experience. "The gods of the religions must show in their
experience of the world that they are the powers which they claim to be"
(1:161). If God is "the all-determiningreality," our experience will confirm it.
And if it doesn't, then God will seem to be no more than a human concept,
"a purely subjective human idea" (1: 159). Monotheism overcame its rivals
because it provided a superior interpretation of human experience. With it
came the conviction that the God of Israel is the God of all humanity, the
world's ultimate sovereign, the one "all-determining reality." Therefore,
theism is the culmination of a religious quest, not a philosophical one.
Pannenberg's doctrine of God also underscores the priority of revelation.
According to a familiar theological tradition, the unity of God is accessibleto
rational inquiry, while the Trinity is hidden. But for Pannenberg, this is
backwards. The distinctions of Father, Son, and Spirit are disclosed in the
event of revelation; "What is hidden is the unity of the divine essence in these
distinctions" (1:341). Consequently, he discusses the Trinity before the divine
unity. This approach echoes a theme found in many contemporary works on
the Trinity-the idea that "the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity."
And it reflew the concern that our understanding of God should come
primarily from God's self-revelation, not from human speculation.
Like others who have commented on the Trinity in recent years,
Pannenbergbemoans the tendency to detach God's essence from h s historical
actions. When the thought of the eternal and essential Trinity "broke loose
from its historical moorings," people began to think of God as "untouched by
the course of history and as inaccessible to all creaturel~knowledge."
Accordingly, he refers the patristic doctrine, which begins with the
revelation of the Father in the Son through the witness of the Spirit, and only
then moves on to the doctrine of the eternal consubstantiality of Father, Son,
and Spirit in the unity of God's eternal essence (1:332).
For Pannenberg, then, God's actionsin salvation history define the divine
essence, revealing that God's inner reality consists of "concrete life relations"
(1335,323). Consequently, the Trinity is not derived from God's essence; the
Trinity is God's essence. We never get behind the Trinity to somethingmore
basic or original. God's fundamental reality is Father, Son, and Spirit. It is not
a single divine essence. Nor is it a single divine person. Consequently, we
should not apply the notion of derivation to the persons of the Trinity. The
Father is not the source or origin of the Son and the Spirit. The persons of the

Trinity are united to each other, not by derivation, but by self-distinaion.
This view of divine relations is basic to the idea that love is the defdpg
quality of God, for love is supremelyrelational. So, if God is truly love, there
must be relations in the very depths of the divine being.
The love that defmes God's inner reality comes to expression in a l l God's
relations to the world, and this has profound implications for his creative
activity. It means that God's decision to create is entirely kee, and this means
that the world he creates is entirely contingent. It exists only because God
chose to create it. As an expression of the world's radical contingency,
Pannenberg defends the venerable concept of creatio ex nihilo-a move that
sets him apart from many contemporary thinkers. (He is particularly critical
of process philosophers, for whom God creates by interacting with another
~rinciplein the universe that is just as basic as he is3
But if love means that God is free to create or not, it also means that God
is irreversibly committed to the world he bringsinto existence. In fact, he
loves the world so much that his very life is bound up with what he has made
(1:447). This trinitarian concept of God provides the basis for Pannenbergls
entire theological project. Its overarching objective is to show that the love of
God comes to expression in creating a f ~ t world
e
and ultimately
incorporatingit "into the unity of the trinitarian life" (3:646).5
Volume 2: Creation and Incarnation
The trinitarian view of God means that God's dealings with creation not
only portray his inner relations; they bring these relations to fulfillment. This
is particularly vivid in the incarnation, the central act in salvation history. The
Son creates a world distinct from God out of his own eternal and free selfdistinction from the Father (2:63; cf. 30,58). Then he fulfiis the working of the
Logos throughout the world by entering creation in human form. The
incarnation, therefore, is "simply the theologically highest instance of
creationn(2:114).Again, through the Spirit the Son brings the creatures into his
own fellowship with the Father (2:32).
What is true of creation generally is doubly true of human beings, the most
highly developed of living creatures. Their appearance brings to light the
meaning of all creaturelyreality (2: 133,135). The incarnation, in turn,fulfiisthe
purpose of their existence, making possible their ultimate incorporation within
'Although he rejects this fundamental aspect of process thought in favor of the more
traditional account, Pannenberg approves of the process notion that God works on his
creatures by persuasion rat+ than force (2:15-16).
'Cf. 2:75, where he states that the goal of creation is "theparticipation of creatures in
the trinitarian fellowship of the Son with the Father."

the fellowship of God's own being.6Jesus' relation to the Father thus fulfrlls the
destiny of creation generally, and of human beings in particular (2:115).
The incarnation also sheds light on two other aspects of Christian
anthropology, namely, personness and destiny. Jesus' message that God
reaches out with eternal love to each of his creatures, especially those who
have gone astray, led to the idea that each human life in its individual
uniqueness has infinite worth to God. Later Christianthinkers related this idea
to the unity of Jesus with the divine Logos. As Jesus, the eternal Son, is a
"person" in relation to the Father, so "all individuals are persons in virtue of
the relation to God, which is the basis of their whole existence" (2: 199-200).
As for human destiny, the Son of God came in the flesh in order to
overcome sin and death (2:202), so the incarnation lies behind each
person's destiny of fellowship with God. The incarnation also enables us
to share in the 'image of God.' According to Paul, the true image of God
appeared in Jesus Christ-indeed, only in Jesus with full clarity-and his
salvation enables us to participate in it (2:208,216). So, Jesus Christ brings
to fulfillment our destiny as creatures (2210).
Pannenberg's anthropology has a decidedly eschatological cast. Human
destiny, he insists, was not fulfilled at the beginning of human history, but
"will come only as the goal and consummation of this history" (23223). The
same is true of creation as a whole: we must view it from the end. "The
eschatological future of God in the coming of his kingdom is the standpoint
from which to understand the world as a wholen (2:146).
It is also the only standpoint for responding to the problem of evil. Says
Pannenberg, "There is no theodicy without eschatologyn (2:173). It is a
mistake to try to absolve God of responsibility for evil, he says. The attempt
cannot succeed, and besides, the cross shows that God accepted responsibility
for the world he created (2:166). Because he foresees and permits evil,
responsibility for its entrance into the world inevitably falls on God. He
risked sin and evil when he created human beings who were free. The
important thmg is that God cares for his creation and eventually overcomes
its suffering. And this, after all, is what innocent and disproportionate
sufferingcries out for-"a real overcoming of eviln (2:164).
Human sin has its origin in our situation as finite beings who are
"open to the world' and destined for fellowship with God. We achieve
this destiny when we accept our status as creatures and distinguish God
from everything finite, including ourselves. As finite beings, however, we
are naturally self-assertive; we arrogate to ourselves a share of the divine
life. Only by accepting our finitude as God-given do we attain to
&In the incarnation of the Son, creaturely existence in its distinction from God, but
also in its destiny of fellowship with him, comes to fulfiient" (223 1).

fellowship with God. In other words, we must be fashioned into the
image of the Son, who accepted self-distinctionfrom the Father (2:23O-31).
Pannenberg's position on death is somewhat ambiguous. According to
the Bible, he observes, death is a consequence of sin. It is not a penalty
imposed from without, but the natural result of breaking our relationship
with God, the source of life (2:270). At the same time, however, he says that
death is intrinsic to human finitude, since all physical organisms come to an
end. For many contemporary theologians, this connection severs the link
between death and sin, and only our consciousnessof sin leads us to see death
as punishment (2:267-268). But Pannenberg rejects the idea that death is a
natural consequence of finitude. Because Christian hope expects a life without
death (ICor 15:52ff), it is clear that finitude does not always have to include
mortality. "Only of existence in time," he says enigmatically, "is it true that
the finitude of life and mortality go together" (2:272).
Pannenberg's soteriologyincludes some of the most familiar aspects of his
work-his Christology from below and his insistence on the historicity of
Jesus and the reality of the resurrection.' For him, who Jesus was is basic to
what Jesus did.*Pannenberg's Christologyalso provides a good example of his
theological method, for he often arrives at somewhat traditional conclusions
by strikingly contemporary arguments. In this case, he begins where modern
approaches to Christology do, with the history of Jesus. Yet he concludes
with the "high Christology" of the Fathers that Jesus is both divine and
human. There is an inner continuity, he insists, between the message of the
historical Jesus and the apostolic preaching of Christ, and Jesus' resurrection
is the necessary connection between the two. Indeed, the resurrection is
utterly basic to Jesus' identity. "Only by his resurrection from the dead did
the crucified attain to the dignity of the Kyrios (Phil. 2:9-11). Only thus was
he appointed the Son of God in power @om. 1:4)" (2:283). "Only Easter
determines what the meaning was of the pre-Easter history of Jesus and who
he was in his relation to G o d (2:345). It confirms that Jesus was the Son of
God as far back as the beginning of his earthly existence (2:365-366).
Pannenberg's position on Jesus' resurrection is one of the best-known
aspects of his t h ~ u g h tHe
. ~ insists, as he has throughout his career, that the
resurrection was a historical,factual event (2:285). Otherwise, he argues, there
71twas Pannenberg'sposition on the resurrection that catapulted him to international
prominenceyears ago while he was still in his thirties. See, for example,his article, "DidJesus
Really Rise From the Dead," in Didlog 4 (1965):128-135.
'Pannenberg devotes two chapters to the person of Christ and one to Christ's work.
Vannenberg's discussion here recapindates many of the points made in his earher work,
Jesus-Godand*,
trans. LewisL.W i h and Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia:Wesuninster Press,
1968).

is no way to acmunt for the history of the church's confession of Christ. He
appeals to the traditions of the resurrection appearancesand the empty tomb,
and he connectsJesus' resurrection to the idea of a general resurrection of the
dead. Without the background of a general resurrection, he maintains, the
claim that Jesus has risen from the dead cannot make sense. Conversely,Jesus'
own resurrection supports belief in a general resurrection of the dead. Thus,
Jesus' resurrection points to the universal transformationof humanity and the
world that is still to come (2:531).
As Pannenberg understands the Trinity, we have seen, the events of
salvation history mirror, exprey and fulfrll the inner life of God. Accordingly,
the incarnation is basic to every aspect of Christian faith, particularly our
understanding of humanity and divinity. The incarnation shows that there is a
basic compatibility between human existence and the divine. The Son's selfdistinction from the Father, which is central to the divine life, comes to
expression in all creation, but particularly in human beings. So, "human nature
as such is ordained for the incarnation of the eternal Son in it," and "the selfdistinction of the Son from the Father can take shape in us" (238186).
The Son's role in the Trinity reaches its fullest expression in the supreme
moment of salvation history. "The remoteness from God on the cross,"
Pannenberg asserts,"was the climax of his selfdistiiction from the Father."
Jesus' obedience unto death thus fulfded the mission God gave the eternal Son.
Contrary to widespread misunderstanding Jesus did not abandon his divine
essence as the Son of God when he "emptied himself." Instead, he actively
expressed it. "Hence the end of his earthly path in obedience to the Father is the
revelation of his deity." As the great hymn of Phil 2 indicates, the path of Jesus
to the cross was that of the preexistent Son of God (2:375,377).
The event that most fully expressesGod's inner nature also reveals the kind
of sovereignty God exercises. Christ brings God's kingdom, not by gaining
political power over the nations, but by his death. God establisheshis rule in the
world "without oppression and with respect for the independenceof creatures"
(2:394).
The incarnation also fulfills the reciprocal movement in the history
of salvation. It not only brings to expression God's inner reality; it also
brings human beings, and ultimately all creation, into the inner life of
God. Says Pannenberg, "By the incarnation of the Son, sinners . . . are
brought into the trinitarian fellowship of God, and thus made participants
in eternal life" (2:390).1° His soteriology thus embraces the ancient idea
that the goal of salvation is to divinize humanity.

'The incarnation "brings creation into the trinitarian fellowship"(2:389).

Volume 3: Church and Consummation
Three long chapterson the church form the bulk of vol. 3. One of the most
interesting f e a ~ e of
s his ecdgiology is the way Pannenberg treats individual
salvation.The longest chapter of his Systematic Theology-338 pages!-is entitled
"The Messianic Community and Individuals." By incorporatingthe discussion
of individual experience of salvation within the framework of the church, he
counteracts the widespread impression that salvation is primarily an individual,
if not private, experience, and church membership is secondary if not
incidental." Since both are essential,he argues, it is a mistake to think either that
churchparticipationprecedesindividual salvationor that the church is somehow
secondary or supplementary to an individual's faith (3:9f).
Nevertheless,Pannenberg gives the individual's experiencepriority.Jesus
addressed individuals when he proclaimed the imminent rule of God, he
observes, and the church directs its missionary message and liturgical
proclamation primarily to individuals (3:98). Moreover, confession and
baptism are basic to church fellowship, and these are the actions of an
individual. On the other hand, Pannenberg rejects the "individualisticJesuspiety" that characterizes the attitudes of a gpod many Christians (3:125-126).
Jesus surrounded himself with disciples during his earthly life, and after Easter
belonging to Jesus was mediated by the fellowship of his church (3:125).
Pannenberg's discussionof salvation gives aprominent place to trinitarian
themes, especiallythe work of the Holy Spirit. The life-giving function of the
Spirit consummates God's work in both creation and salvation (3:l-2).And,
the Spirit plays an important role in the Gospel accounts of Jesus' life. The
Father gives the Holy Spirit to the Son, who gives the Spirit back to the
Father at his death (3:ll).The most vivid manifestation of the Spirit is Jesus'
resurrection, but it also fded his pre-Easter life (3:6).
Just as it affects the relation of the Son and the Father, the incarnation
reflects and modifies the relation between Son and Spirit in eternity. The Son
receives the Spirit from the Father in eternity, but in the incarnationthe Holy
Spirit comes in the form of a gft. Both the life- and &-giving work of the
Spirit are evident in the recipients of salvation, too. Christ's resurrection
signifies to believers their own resurrection from the dead, and God's Spirit
provides lasting endowments to the church (39, 11).
The Spirit's most important soteriological work is to connect
believers with the Son and thus incorporate them in the inner life of God.
"At times, however, Pannenberg's way of phrasing the relation between salvation and
church gives priority to the individual's experience. In the forewordto volume 3, for example,
he places the focus of the discussion "onindividual participation in salvation, with the church
and sacraments simply as signs of its future consummation." "Itis only in the immediacy of the
personal relation to God,"he states, "thatfuture salvation is already at work" (3:xiii).

The experience of believers mirrors trinitarian relations in several ways.
The same mutual love that unites Father and Son in eternity appears in
believers. They likewise receive the gift of the Spirit from the Father and
the Son, and when they are linked to the Son by faith and baptism, they
become members of his body. As a result, they share in Jesus' own
sonship and participate in the intratrinitarian life of God. Like Jesus, they
receive the Spirit from the Father, and return it by offering prayer and
praise (3:ll). And they enjoy eternal life through their union with God.
"The Spirit binds himself to the lives of his recipients so that even death
can no longer separate their lives from his creative power" (3:12).
As the Spirit unites believers with God, it also unites them with each other
and thus creates the church. And the fact that the Holy Spirit was poured out
upon all believers identifiesthis communityas the recipient of end-timeuniversal
salvation (3:13). The fellowship of the church prefigures the eschatological
fellowship of humanity in the coming kingdom of God (3:134135).
Pannenberg's comments on the church and the kingdom reflect classic
Protestant positions. Jesus addressed his proclamation of God's imminent
reign directly to individuals, he observes, and did "not attempt to gather
together an eschatological remnant community or any other form of
historical manifestation of the true people of God" (3:27). Therefore,
there is a clear distinction between the church and the kingdom of God.
The church is not the kingdom, but the "sign," "tool," or "sacrament" of
the kingdom (3:45). The kingdom itself is an eschatological reality. It is
the future which Christian hope anticipates. Nevertheless, it is a future
that is already to a degree present and accessible through the church,
"through its proclamation and its liturgical life." The Lord's Supper, in
particular, anticipates human fellowship in the saving future of God's
rule. Indeed, "nowhere else in the church's life does the nature of its
whole existence as a sign find such clear expression as here" (3:31). The
reason is the way it continues Jesus' own table fellowship, which was
open to all members of society, particularly the poor and the outcast.
The distinction between church and kingdom means that we can never
identdy the kingdom with any development this side of the future
consummation,for only then will the righteous will of God be established. It is
not the church's task to "bridge the distinction between spiritual and secular,"
Pannenberg insiis. And liberationtheology "rests on an illusion" if its advocates
believe that revolutionary action can actualize God's kingdom (355).
Pannenberg describes faith and love as "the basic saving works of the
Spirit in individual Christians" (3:135). His discussion of faith recapitulates
some of the themes for whch he is well known. Faith is not its own
foundation. It does not guarantee the truth and reality of its contents, but

relies instead on a basis outside itself--on God and on his revelation in the
history of Israel and its fulfillment in Jesus. So, faith depends on the truth of
its historical claims (3:142,153). Pannenberg knows full well the tremendous
challenges facingsuch a position since the rise of the historical-critid method,
but he is insistent. The basic claims at the heart of Christianity can be
established by reasonable arguments, he holds (1:154). And, assurance is
possible for believers when they place these claims, and their lives, within the
broad context of the cosmic reality of which we are part (3:170).
Both faith and hope have an ecstatic quality that finds fulfillment in
love. Love unites us to God and gives us a share in his own nature. Thus,
the love we experience is not primarily a human act, but the activity of
the Spirit through which God reaches out in and through us. As a result,
love for the neighbor is not something we do, but something God does
through us. Because we participate in the divine life, the love that God is
in his "intratrinitarian life" flows through us into the world. Thus, we
become part of God's movement toward the "creation, reconciliation, and
consummation" of the world" (3:193).
Pannenberg provides extensive essays on the sacraments and the ministry
of the church, but none of his comments are more thought-provoking than his
discussion of the Lord's Supper. By his account, worship is constitutive of the
church's life, and the Lord's Supper is central to the church's worship. In fact,
the liturgical life of the church brings to fullest expression its essential reality as
the "eschatological community," representing the fellowship of all humankind
in God's future reign (3:292). The Lord's Supper acquires this ~ i ~ c a n c e
through the ministry of Jesus. When he instituted the Supper, he brought his
disciples together in a way they had never been before. And when he ate with
them after the resurrection, he established the Supper as the primary means for
his followers to experience his presence all through history (3:291).
To understand the Lord's Supper, Pannenberg maintains, we must bear in
mind the role of table fellowship throughout Jesus' ministry. It induded his
miraculous feeclings, the meals he ate with others, especiallythose marginalized
by conventional religious standards, the feast prepared by the father of the
prodigal son, and the banquet ~arableshe used to depict the fellowship of the
coming kingdom. In light of all this, Jesus' table fellowshippoints to the coming
rule of God and underscores the mutual fellowship of all who share the meal,
with each other and with God (3:286). Even the cry, 'Come, Lord Jesug" says
Pannenberg, "invites Jesus to table fellowship in anticipation of God's coming
kingdomn(3:320). This table fellowship also showsus how important the Lord's
Supper is to our relationship with Jesus now. People who want the Lord's
companionship muse seek it where he makes it available-at the supper which
he instituted Jesus says, in effect, this is where I will meet you, and if you want

my fellowship, you must accept the fellowship of those whom I welcome, and
those whom I seek, namely, the poor and outcast (cf.3330).
Just as God's relation to creation culminates in the final future,
Pannenberg's entire project culminates in its final chapter, "The
Consummation of Creation in the Kingdom of God." Here he deals
explicitly with the principal themes that pervade his discussion. The final
future is not the aftermath, but the foundation, of everything that comes
before. Everything depends on the way history ends. Until then, all that
Christians believe is fragmentary and inconclusive. Says Pannenberg, "Only
in the eschaton does the reconciliation of the world come to completion with
the new life of the resurrection of the dead in the kingdom of God." And
"only the eschatological consummation of the world will bring definitive
proof of God's existence and final clarification of the character of his nature
and works." Until history finally reaches its conclusion, God's love and
wisdom-indeed, his very existence-will always be open to question (363 1).
For this reason, "eschatology is not just the subject of a single chapter in
dogmatics; it determines the perspective of Christian doctrine as a wholen
(353 1).Indeed, for Pannenberg, the final future has profound epistemological
and ontological ~ i ~ c a n c"As
e . regards its content and truth all Christian
doctrine depends on the future of God's own coming to consummate his rule
over creation." And, "On the path of their history in time objects and people
exist only in anticipation of that which they will be in the light of their fina
future, the advent of Godn (3:531). The final future is also essential to the
meaning of every historical event. Events acquire meaning from context, the
ultimate context of historical events is the totality of reality, and this is
achieved only when history comes to an end.
Pannenberg's reflections on the frnal future contain a host of intriguing
ideas. In the work of judgment, he says, for example, God is not arbitrary; he
does not inflict punishment capriciously, but leaves people to the consequences
of their own choices. He executes "what is in the nature of the case" (3:611).
Pannenberg also has valuable things to say about individual eschatology. He
persuasively defends the concept of bodily resurrection against rival notions of
life after death, particularly the immortality of the soul.And he helpfullypoints
out that resurrection has a corporate, social dimension that is lacking from
traditional views of immortality (3563-573).
Perhaps most ~ i ~ c a nPannenberg
t,
gives the final future a pneumatological character. The work of the Spirit, he says, is "constitutive" of Christ's
return. It completesthe work that began in the incarnation and the resurrection
of Jesus. The life of the risen Lord is "wholly permeated by the Spirit and
radiates the Spirit." The Spirit's work is fulf~lledwhen Christ renews his
fellowship with believers (3:627). This future fellowship will be highly social. It

will incorporate all the redeemed into one encompassingexperience. "The new
life of the resurrection," he says, is "a removal of the individual autonomy and
separation that are part of the corporeality of earthly life, though with no simple
erasure of individual particularity" (3:628-629). So, individuality will evidently
be preserved in the final future, but without any of the tensions or rights or
rivalry that characterize human relations now.
But just what does this final future consist of? PannenbergYsresponse
is the most paradoxical element in his thought-an event he variously
identifies as "the coming of eternity into time," and "the dissolving of
time in eternity" (3595, 607).12 But, however phrased, it is the idea that
time gives way to timelessness, and temporal succession comes to an end.
The final future is not a transition to a continuing life of temporal
experiences, but a single, all-encompassing experience, an endpoint that
subsumes the entire course of history that precedes it, a timeless moment
which encompasses the entire realm of temporal passage.
As Pannenberg describes the consummation of all things, the crucial idea
emerges that God exists in an eternal present. The divine life is characterized
by an "eternal simultaneity," says Pannenberg. "To God all things that were
are always present." The ultimate destiny of creaturely existence is to
participate in the eternity of God, and this happens when time is "taken up"
into "the eternal simultaneity of the divine life." Only when we enter this
simultaneity can we fulfil our destiny as individuals to belong to the whole
of human society across all the separate epochs of history (3:607). For
Pannenberg, eternity thus consists in "an undivided present" (3:630). This
amplifies his description of divine eternity in volume 1.Whereas creatures are
"subject to the march of time," "all things are always present to [God]." "The
eternal God has no future ahead of him that is different from his present. For
this reason, that which has been is still present to him" (1:410). In order for
finite creatures to enjoy endless life, Pannenberg indicates, they must "pass
through" the temporal sphere. "Only of existence in time is it true that the
finitude of life and mortality go togethern(2:272).
In the final future, all creatures achleve simultaneous existence in the
eternity of God's own life. And as Pannenberg describes it, they will
experience in one timeless moment all the events of their historical existence.
"The ddferences of moments of time and the tenses" will be preserved, but
they are "no longer seen apart" (3:607). This amplifies Pannenbergysearlier
reflections on meaning and totality. As we saw, his view of historical meaning
requires a final future, for an event acquires meaning within the whole series
it belongs to, and a sequence of temporal events becomes a totality when it
lZ"Therelation between time and eternity is the crucial problem in eschatology,"says
Pannenberg, "and its solution has implications for all parts of Christian doctrinem(3:595).

comes to an end. Now we see that the final future renders history a totality
by making all its moments simultaneous. When human beings enter eternal
life, then, the final future which brings history to an end, they enter into
God's own life, where they experience the full expanse of their historical
existence in one simultaneous moment of perception.
This unites, and completes, the trinitarian and eschatological themes that
pervade Pannenberg's system. In the words of the final paragraph, the divine
economy of salvation from creation to the eschatological future of salvation
expresses "the incursion of the eternal future of God to the salvation of
creatures." Out of eternal love, God comes forth "from the immanence of the
divine life and incorporates the creatures into the unity of the trinitarian life."
"The distinction and unity of the immanent and economic Trinity constitute
the heartbeat of the divine love, and with a single such heartbeat this love
encompasses the whole world of creatures" (3:646).

Observations and Questions
Pannenberg's achievement is noteworthy for many reasons. For one,
it is proof positive that systematic theology is alive and well after a rather
serious decline. For several decades interest in the central themes of
historic Christianity was eclipsed by a preoccupation with methodological
issues and the fragmentation of special perspectives. Recently, however,
scholars have returned in impressive numbers to the task of constructing
a comprehensive interpretation of Christian faith.13Many of these current
theological works have interesting things to say, but Pannenberg's
expansive offering is in a class by itself, a "systematic theology" in the best
sense. It is a comprehensive, constructive reflection on all the basic
elements of Christian faith. It achieves an overarching unity, without
slavishly following a prescription or forcing material into an artificial
scheme. It follows the standard sequence of doctrinal topics, yet engages
the tradition with remarkable creativity. And it shows that Pannenberg
is versed in all the disciplines that such a task requires in today's
world-biblical studies, philosophy, and the history of religions, as well
as anthropology and psychology. In short, it is just the sort of work that
every theologian dreams of producing.
While studying Pannenberg pays rich dividends, it is also a daunting
task. The scope, content, and style of the work present formidable
challenges. For the most part, the translation is serviceable, but it could
use more clarity in places, and it has produced (like the German) some
"Rebecca S. Chopp and Gabriel Fackre surveyed the field a few years ago and found
"a remarkable outpouringn of recent theological offerings ("Recent Works in Systematic
Theology"Religioau Studies Review 20 [1994], 7).

very long English sentences. The pages are so densely packed they often
yield their meaning only after several readings. And sadly, there are very
few "ringing sentences," statements that have you reaching for a pen to
copy them or leave you wishing you'd said that.
In spite of the broad scope of this work, there are times when
Pannenberg's points need more development. For example, his explicit
references to t h e o d i c ~are rather dismissive. He merely asserts that God
is responsible for evil since he foresaw that it would enter the world-a
move that leaves a host of important questions not only unanswered,
but unacknowledged, including the relation of human freedom and
divine foreknowledge and the relation of divine and creaturely
responsibility.
On a thematic level, I believe, the most noteworthy feature of the
project is the way it draws the entire range of Christian thought into the
framework of the Trinity. The Trinity is more than the pervasive theme
we mentioned earlier. It is the overarching framework in which all the
elements of Christian faith find their setting, just as every aspect of
creation finds its ultimate destiny within God's own life.
Over the past twenty-fiveyears or so, Christiantheologians have devoted
considerable attention to the doctrine of the Trinity." In certain ways
Pannenberg's project provides a culmination of this development, for it not
only clarifies the meaning of this venerable doctrine and reasserts its current
value, but it developsfrom trinitarianinsights a full-fledgedtheological system.
As many recent studies argue, the essential insight of the Trinity is
that salvation history provides a portrait of God's own life, indeed the
only portrait that should concern us.15God's dealings with creation show,
contrary to the dominant theological tradition, that God's innermost
reality is complex, relational, and dynamic.16 Indeed, it is temporal.17And
'SO many studies have accumulated that there are now books discussing all the books
on the topic. See, for example,John Thompson, M o h TrinitarianPerspectives (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994)' and Ted Peters, God as Trinity: Rekztionality and
Temporality in Divine Life (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1993).
''Catherine Mowry LaCugna emphasizes this point: "The quest for knowledge of God
or of God's ousia 'in itself' or 'by itself' is doomed to failn(Godfor Us: The Trinity and
Christian Life [Scranton, PA: HarperCollins, 19911,193)."The very nature of God who is
self-communicatinglove is expressed in what God does in the events of redemptive history.
There is no hidden God . . . behind the God of revelation history, no possibility that God
is in God's eternal mystery other than what God reveals Godself to be" (LaCugna, 322). Cf.
the assertion of Robert W. Jenson: "Each of the inner-trinitarian relations is then an
affirmationthat as God works creatively among us, so he is in himself" (The Triune Identity:
God According to the Gospel Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 19821, 107).
16AsClark Pinnock says, "God's nature is that of a communion of three Persons who exist
in mutual relations with one another. Each is distinct from the others, but each is what it is in

they show that creation has intra-divine significance; it makes a difference
to God's inner life.
Pannenberg takes this line of thought a step further and asserts that
God's dealings with creation not only express, but fuIf;ZZthe divine life.
God creates out of perfect freedom, but once the world exists, he so
commits himself to it that his own destiny, and his own identity, are
forever linked to that of his creatures (1:447). The Son brings into
existence a creation distinct from God out of his own eternal selfdistinction from the Father (2:63; 6.30, 58). And through the Spirit, the
Son brings the creatures into his own fellowship with the Father (2:32).
The goal of creation is thus "the participation of creatures in the
trinitarian fellowship of the Son with the Father" (2:75).The future of the
world is nothing other than God's own future.
Pannenberg's eschatology is both the most promising and the most
disappointing aspect of his proposal. Given what he repeatedly says about
the final consummation as the goal toward which creation moves and the
significance of its proleptic arrivals in salvation history, we approach the last
chapter of his project, which takes up explicitly eschatologicalthemes, with
great anticipation. We expect it to provide the culmination of all his
reflections, much as the end of history, as he refers to it, will clarify,
complete, and fulfil all that comes before. To the contrary, unfortunately,
his actual discussion of last things is a disappointment. It is both less
extensive and less clear than we hope for.
This may be due in part to the fact that Pannenberg conceives all of
theology as eschatology, much as Paul Tillich conceives all of theology as
anthropology (which is why his Systematic 7 h e o Z o ~contains no "doctrine of
man"). And it may be due in part to the fact that eschatological language

relation to the others. God exists in a dynamic of love, an economy of giving and receiving"
(Flame oflove: A Theologyof theHoly Spirit [Downers Grove, IL:InterVarsity, 1996],30). Or,
to quote LaCugna once again, "The point of the doctrine of the Trinity is that God's ousia exists
only in persons who are toward another, with another, through another" (LaCugna, 193).
Elizabeth A. Johnson makes the same point: "Trinitarian communion itself is primordial, not
something to be added after the one God is desmbed, for there is no God who is not relational
through and through." "For God as God, divine nature is fundamentally relational" (She Who
Is: fie Mystery of God in Feminist TheologicalDiscoursem e w York: Crossroad, 19941,227,228.

"In Keith Ward's words, the Trinity stresses "the creative, relational, and unitive
involvement of God in the temporal structure of the created universe" and "the importance
of that temporal structure to the self-expression of the divine being" (Religionand Creation:
Theoretical Approaches [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19961, 345). Robert Jenson is more
emphatic: "The three derive from God's reality in time, from time's past/present/future.
. . . The relations are either temporal relations or empty verbiage" (Jenson, 125-126).
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refers to t h g s that by nature lie "beyond human comprehension."'* But
Pannenberg's account of last things adds little to his earlier comments about
the end and, worse, what he does say undercuts some of the fundamental
themes of his entire system-the importance of hstory and the dynamic
nature of God's reality.
The central difficulty in Pannenberg's eschatology is his recourse to
the concept of eternity as a moment in which all time is compressed.
God's mode of existence is an eternal present, and history reaches its final
consummation when finite beings are incorporated and united into this
single momentary experience.
The difficulties with this notion of divine timelessness are numerous and
profound. First of all, Pannenberg simply asserts eternity as the essentialmode
of God's existence, rather than arguing for it. Second, he leaves us wondering
what a non-temporalfinite existencewould consist of. Temporality is inherent
to finite existence as we know it. Indeed, it seems inherent to finite existence
as we could possibly conceive it. So, Pannenberg's designation of the final
future as timeless seems incoherent. Perhaps most important, the idea of a
single eternal moment contradicts the essential insight of the Trinity, namely,
that God's dealings with creation express and fulfd God's innermost life. If
God's dealings with the creatures are temporal through and through, and
God's own life is not temporal, then these dealings do not accurately portray
God's inner reality after all. Indeed, they misrepresent God's essential nature.
And with this, the basis of Pannenberg's proposal fractures. There are ways,
of course, to conceive divine temporality which overcome the standard
objections. (An impressive case can be made for a supreme instance of
becoming.) Process thinkers and, more recently, proponents of an open view
of God are well acquainted with them. Those who see promise in
Pannenberg's emphasis on historical revelation and God's intimate
involvement with temporal creatures should consult their writings, too.
'*PannenbergYs
brief appeal to the metaphorical nature of eschatologicallanguage does
little to solve the problem. He indicates that the events do not lie in "the sphere of our
present experience"and that our language about them is metaphorical. At the same time, he
insists that "the matter itself is not metaphor, only the way of stating it," and that the
concept of the kingdom of God "contains metaphorical features," but is not "totally
metaphorical"(3:621-622).Just where metaphorends and literal descriptionbegins, however,
Pannenberg does not say.

